The Status of Pending Air Carrier Litigation by Benson, Barry F. & Rosa, Jill Dahlmann
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 66 | Issue 4 Article 4
2001
The Status of Pending Air Carrier Litigation
Barry F. Benson
Jill Dahlmann Rosa
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and
Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Barry F. Benson et al., The Status of Pending Air Carrier Litigation, 66 J. Air L. & Com. 1367 (2001)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol66/iss4/4
THE STATUS OF PENDING AIR CARRIER LITIGATION
BARRY F. BENSON AND JILL DAHLMANN ROSA*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .................................. 1368
II. SINGAPORE AIRLINES FLIGHT SQ006
(O ctober 31, 2000) ................................ 1368
III. AIR FRANCE CONCORDE FLIGHT 4590
(July 25, 2000) ..................................... 1372
IV. ALASKA AIRLINES FLIGHT 261
(January 31, 2000) ................................. 1374
V. EGYPTAIR FLIGHT 990 (October 31, 1999) ...... 1376
VI. AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 1420
(June 1, 1999) ..................................... 1379
A. W ARSAW CASES ................................. 1381
B. NON-WARSAW CASES ............................ 1383
C. CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES ........... 1383
VII. SWISSAIR FLIGHT 111 (September 2, 1998) ...... 1384
VIII. SILKAIR FLIGHT M1185 (December 19, 1997) ... 1386
IX. KOREAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 801
(August 5, 1997) ................................... 1389
A. WARSAW CONVENTION ISSUES ................... 1390
B. DAMAGES ISSUES ................................ 1391
1. Venue ....................................... 1391
2. Choice of Law ............................... 1392
X. TRANSPORTES AEREOS REGIONAIS
(O ctober 31, 1996) ................................ 1393
XI. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES FLIGHT 800
(July 17, 1996) ..................................... 1394
A. THE SECOND CIRCUIT DECISION ................. 1395
B. THE 2000 AMENDMENTS TO DOHSA ............ 1396
* Attorneys, United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Torts Branch,
Aviation and Admiralty Litigation. The views expressed in this article are those of
the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Justice
or the United States.
1367
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
C. OTHER LITIGATION EVENTS ..................... 1397
XII. AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 965
(Decem ber 20, 1995) .............................. 1397
XIII. PAN AM FLIGHT 103 (December 21, 1988) ...... 1398
A. CRIMINAL ACTION .............................. 1398
B. CIVIL ACTIONS .................................. 1399
1. Plaintiffs vs. Pan Am ........................ 1399
2. Plaintiffs vs. Libya .......................... 1399
3. Insurance Company vs. Libya ................ 1401
I. INTRODUCTION
TJHIS ARTICLE will review significant developments that oc-
curred during the year 2000 in air carrier litigation involv-
ing both domestic and foreign carriers. Three airlines had
major accidents: Alaska Airlines, Air France, and Singapore Air-
lines. The most significant development in the law involved
changes in the jurisdictional scope and recovery permitted
under the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA).1 Passengers
on commercial aircraft may now recover damages under
DOHSA for certain non-economic losses that were formerly not
recoverable.2
II. SINGAPORE AIRLINES FLIGHT SQ006
(OCTOBER 31, 2000)
Singapore Airlines Flight SQ006 to Los Angeles, a Boeing
747-400 aircraft, crashed and caught fire during takeoff from
Chiang Kai-shek International Airport, Taipei, Taiwan, on Octo-
ber 31, 2000. Of the 179 people on board, 159 passengers and
20 crewmembers, 83 were killed and at least 68 were injured.
Forty-seven U.S. citizens were on-board the flight, and of that
number, 23 survived. The other passengers on the flight were
mostly from Singapore or Taiwan. The flight was on the wrong
runway, 05-R instead of 05-L, and hit a concrete barrier and
some construction equipment approximately 4000 feet into its
takeoff roll.3 The crew apparently realized there was something
on the runway seconds before the aircraft crashed into the
equipment and broke in two. Immediately after the first officer
called "Vee one," the captain said, "[S]omething there." Even
I Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 761-68 (West 2001).
2 Id. § 761(b).
3 Investigation to Focus on Human Factors and Emergency Evacuation, AiR SArEm'
WEEK, March 5, 2001, available at 2001 WL 5390912.
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though the aircraft caught fire, rescuers managed to pull dozens
of passengers from the wreckage.
Several minutes before the attempted takeoff of SQ006, Chi-
ang Kai-shek Airport was reporting heavy rain with wind gusts up
to 64 miles per hour (mph). Runway visibility was reported at
less than a quarter mile.4 Chiang Kai-shek Airport control tower
has no ground radar. A crewmember who survived the accident
admitted the pilot knew that the aircraft had been assigned Run-
way 05-L for takeoff. Airport officials admitted there was no
barrier set up to prevent an aircraft from taxiing onto the closed
runway.5 Taiwan aviation officials stated that the runway was not
blocked because some of it was being used as a taxiway.' There
are conflicting reports as to whether the lights to the closed run-
way had been turned on with Typhoon Xangsane approaching
the island,' or whether the closed runway was correctly lit as a
taxiway in accordance with international requirements.
Prior to the accident, Singapore Airlines had no fatal crashes
in its 28-year history. Singapore Airlines accepted that its air-
craft was on the wrong runway at the time of the crash8 but also
called for an investigation as to how this could have occurred.
Further, the airline called for a review of the facilities at Tai-
wan's airport.9
On February 23, 2001, the Taiwanese Aviation Safety Council
(ASC) released a preliminary factual report on the accident.10
Although the investigators reached no conclusions about the
cause of the accident, they mentioned a number of actions and
omissions by the pilots and Chiang Kai-shek International Air-
port staff that may have contributed to the disaster. The ASC
appeared to rule out mechanical problems with the aircraft, al-
4 AVweb News Wire, At Least 79 Killed in Singapore Airlines 747 Crash in Taiwan
(Nov. 2, 2000), available at http://www.avweb.com/newswire/news0044b.html.
5 Id.
6 AVweb News Wire, Ground Video May Hold the Clue in the Crash of Singapore
Airlines Flight SQO06 (Nov. 13, 2000), available at http://www.avweb.com/new-
swire/news0046a.html.
7 Airwise News, Singapore Crash-Were Closed Runway's Lights On? (Nov. 6,
2000), available at http://news.airwise.com/stories/2000/11/973514060.html.
8 Airwise News, Singapore Airlines Accepts Responsibility for Crash (Nov. 12, 2000),
available at http://news.airwise.com/stories/2000/11/973336203.html.
9 South China Morning Post, SIA Crash Probe May Take a Year (Nov. 14, 2000),
available at http://www.singapore-window.org/swOO/001114sc.htm.
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though the failure of doors and escape slides is one area of focus
of the investigation.
The report states that the flight crew knew that Runway 5-R
was closed for construction work. The crew all thought they
were on Runway 5-L for takeoff. In fact, they told the control
tower five times that they were on 5-L. The crew had mistakenly
followed a curving line of green lights onto Runway 5-R while
they were trying to get to 5-L, and ignored the onboard runway
guidance computer (the Parallel Visual Display), which was acti-
vated but did not indicate that the aircraft was properly lined up
with the runway.
The ASC report stated that Runway 5-R did not have a sign
indicating that it was closed. The report noted faults with the
lights and lines down the center of the taxiway leading to Run-
ways 5-L and 5-R. One of the ground lights leading to 5-L was
out and another was very dim. The broken and dim lights were
positioned near the point where the pilots mistakenly turned
onto the wrong runway. Runway 5-L also lacked flashing yellow
guard lights at the intersection with the taxiway, which would
indicate that it was a low-visibility runway. The broad white
stripes marking the threshold to 5-R had not been covered, and
the runway centerline lights were on. In interviews with investi-
gators, the pilots said they went down Runway 5-R because it
"looked correct," and they didn't take particular notice of any
signs or numbers. They stated they believed a closed runway
would have no lights.
There are three groups of cases arising out of this accident.
First, are the cases governed by the Warsaw Convention for
which there is Article 28 Treaty Jurisdiction in the United States.
The families of at least seven people killed in the accident have
filed no fewer than twelve lawsuits against the airline. The ma-
jority of these cases are in the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California." The Judicial Panel on Multi-district Liti-
gation (MDL) assigned the cases to Judge Gary A. Feess, Central
District of California, for consolidated discovery proceedings.
Second are the Warsaw Convention cases where there is no
treaty jurisdiction in the United States. In one such case, an
Australian woman injured in the crash filed suit in the United
11 Lawsuits Mount Against Singapore Airlines Following Taiwan Crash, AGENCE FR.-
PRESSE, Feb. 27, 2001, available at 2001 WL 2350628.
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States.12 Her complaint states that Singapore Airlines is a mem-
ber of the Star Alliance consortium, which includes United Air-
lines, Air Canada, Lufthansa German Airlines, and All Nippon
Airways, and that the Star Alliance is a "carrier" as defined by the
Warsaw Convention. 13 Therefore, she alleges, there is Treaty ju-
risdiction in the United States because it is the domicile of the
Star Alliance.
Third are cases arguably outside the Warsaw Convention alto-
gether because Taiwan is not a High Contracting Party to the
Convention. These would generally include those passengers
who purchased round-trip tickets from Taiwan to Los Angeles. 4
The Ninth Circuit previously held Taiwan is not bound by the
People's Republic of China's adherence to the Convention and
its declaration that it shall apply to the entire Chinese
territory.15
The airline has offered $400,000 to each of the families of the
83 passengers who were killed in the crash.' 6 This offer extends
to all families, regardless of the passenger's domicile. Some of
the families have accepted the offer, while others have rejected
12 Australian Injured in Taiwan SIA Crash Wants Case Heard in US Court, AIRLINE
INDUS. INFO, Feb. 23, 2001, available at 2001 WL 3339601.
13 Id.
14 The Warsaw Convention governs international transportation by aircraft.
See The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter
Warsaw Convention]. International transportation is defined as:
any transportation in which, according to the contract made by the
parties, the place of departure and the place of destination,
whether or not there be a break in the transportation or a trans-
shipment, are situated either within the territories of two High
Contracting Parties, or within the territory of a single High Con-
tracting Party, if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory
subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of an-
other power, even though that power is not a party to this conven-
tion. Transportation without such an agreed stopping place
between territories subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate,
or authority of the same High Contracting Party shall not be
deemed to be international for the purposes of this convention.
Id. ch. I, art. 1(2).
15 But see Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 1188 (E.D.
Wis. 1992) (holding that Taiwan was part of the People's Republic of China and
thus a party to the Warsaw Convention).
16 Airwise News, Singapore Announces Compensation Offer (Nov. 4, 2000), available
at http://news.airwise.com/stories/2000/11/973343693.html.
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it. 17 The airline has also offered $20,000 to those passengers
who were not injured or who received minor injuries.
III. AIR FRANCE CONCORDE FLIGHT 4590
(JULY 25, 2000)
Air France Concorde Flight 4590 crashed on takeoff from
Paris's Charles de Gaulle Airport on July 25, 2000. All 109 peo-
ple on board were killed as well as five people on the ground.
The Concorde crashed into a small hotel after the crew appar-
ently lost control of the aircraft. Most of the passengers were
German tourists traveling to New York to board a cruise ship.
The French Government launched a two-pronged investiga-
tion: one by civil aviation authorities, the French Accident Inves-
tigation Bureau (BEA), and the other by a three-judge panel to
determine if there are any potential criminal charges because of
the crash. 8 In its interim report, the BEA found that shortly
before rotation, the right front tire of the left main gear blew
after running over a strip of metal, and that pieces of the Con-
corde's tire punctured the fuel tank on the underside of the
wing.'9 French authorities are still attempting to determine
what caused the leaking fuel to ignite, but they theorize that the
fuel was ignited by a spark from electrical wiring or by hot gases
from one of the aircraft's engines.20
A 16-inch titanium strip, called a "wear strip," was found on
the runway following the accident. French authorities believe
the strip was part of an engine assembly that fell off a Continen-
tal DC-10 that departed prior to the Concorde. 2 Continental
has not yet determined whether the strip came from one of its
aircraft. The wear strip was from a General Electric engine, and
is not peculiar to DC-10 aircraft. Air France has filed suit
against Continental in France.
17 Airwise News, Families Reject Singapore Compensation Offer (Nov. 5, 2000), avail-
able at http://news.airwise.com/stories/2000/11/973421848.html.
18 AVweb News Wire, And Now Concorde, Piece By Piece (Nov. 13, 2000), available
at http://www.avweb.com/newswire/news0046a.html.
19 The Interim Report is available at http://www.bea-fr.org/anglaise/con-
corde-en.html.
20 Airwise News, Supersonic Jet Operators Hope To Prove Concorde is Safe to Fly (Dec.
15, 2000), available at http://news.airwise.com/stories/2000/12/976885024.
html.




Air France has agreed to settle the lawsuits of the majority of
the German passengers. 22 All parties agreed to keep the settle-
ment amount secret, but sources have reported that the amount
is $1.2 million per passenger, resulting in a total settlement of
more than $115 million for the ninety-six passengers killed.2 3
One German attorney had previously said he expected Air
France to pay close to $3 million per victim in compensation.24
Several lawsuits have been filed in federal courts in New York
and the Southern District of Florida, naming Air France, Conti-
nental Airlines, McDonnell Douglas, Aerospatiale Marta, Inc.,
BAE (British Aerospace), Goodyear Tire & Rubber, Boeing,
General Electric, and Middle River Aircraft Systems as defend-
ants.25 The suit against Goodyear, the tire manufacturer, alleges
that Goodyear failed to correct problems with the tires despite
numerous reports of blowouts. 26 A pre-filing discovery proceed-
ing in Texas state court was removed to federal court. Plaintiffs
are seeking remand of that proceeding.
Air France and British Airways initially grounded their re-
maining Concorde aircraft until the cause of the crash had been
determined.27 Both airlines are in the process of conducting
flight tests on the Concorde, and hope to return the aircraft to
service in 2001. The safety enhancements may include Kevlar
fuel tank liners and tire guards. 8
22 Airwise News, Concorde Victims'Families Agree on Compensation (May 13, 2001),
available at http://news.airwise.com/stories/2001/05/989 79018 4 .html.
23 News Briefs, 15 AIR SAFETY WEEK 9 (Apr. 23, 2001).
24 Airwise News, Lawyer Expects USD$3m Compensation Payments for Concorde Vic-
tims (Sept. 2, 2000), available at http://news.airwise.com/stories/2000/0 9 /
967921055.html.
25 Airwise News, Air France, Continental and Seven Others Sued Over Concorde Crash
(Sept. 29, 2000), available at http://newg.airwise.com/stories/2000/09/
970221863.html.
26 Susan R. Miller, Concorde Crash Suit Targets U.S. Companies, NAT'L L.J., Oct.
16, 2000, at A7.
27 Airwise News, New Clue in Concorde Crash Investigation (Aug. 4, 2000), available
at http://news.airwise.com/stories/2000/08/965424166.html. For facts and sta-
tistics on the flight crew, the aircraft, and an analysis of the crew's communica-
tions and actions during the accident sequence, see AVweb News Wire, French
Authorities Report On Concorde (Sept. 4, 2000), available at http://www.avweb.com/
newswire/news0036a.html.
28 AVweb News Wire, Concorde Back in 2001 (Dec. 18, 2000), available at http://
www.avweb.com/newswire/news0051a.html.
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IV. ALASKA AIRLINES FLIGHT 261 (JANUARY 31, 2000)
On January 31, 2000, Alaska Airlines Flight 261 crashed into
the Pacific Ocean off the coast of California while en route from
Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, to San Francisco. The aircraft, a Mc-
Donnell Douglas MD-83, carried eighty-three passengers and
five crewmembers. There were no survivors.
The horizontal stabilizer moved to an apparent full nose-
down position as the crew disengaged the autopilot. According
to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the data
indicate that the plane dropped 7000 feet in one minute as the
crew struggled to level it.29 The crew got the aircraft under con-
trol at 24,000 feet, and descended in controlled flight to 18,000
feet. The plane then nose-dived at a sixty-degree angle within
three seconds, eventually reaching an acceleration of negative-3
G's. The aircraft pitched to the left and went inverted, cork-
screwing from 17,900 feet to the ocean in about one minute. 0
The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) contains thirty minutes of
cockpit recording prior to impact.31 When the tape begins, the
crew is already discussing a problem relating to the horizontal
stabilizer. The CVR revealed the presence of two loud and un-
identified noises. The first occurred before the aircraft com-
pleted its first rapid descent. Although the noise was not heard
on the CVR, it was reported to the crew by the flight attendant,
and the crew, in response, indicated they also heard the noise.
While the crew continued to analyze the problem, the CVR re-
corded a loud noise that was believed to be the sound of the
stabilizer breaking free. The crew then suddenly lost control of
the aircraft, and the pilots indicated that the aircraft was in-
verted. Twenty seconds before impact, the captain said, "Gotta
get it over again. At least upside down, we're flying." They were
unsuccessful in their attempt to stabilize the aircraft in inverted
flight, and the last recorded phrase on the CVR was the captain
saying, "Ah, here we go."
The NTSB's investigation of the accident has focused on the
suspected failure of a worn jackscrew assembly of the horizontal
29 Statement by Jim Hall, Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, on
the Investigation of the Crash of Alaska Airlines Flight 261 (Feb. 8, 2000), availa-
ble at http://www.ntsb.gov/speeches/jhc000208.htm.
so Airwise News, NTSB Reveals More Details of Alaska Flight 261 (Feb. 9, 2000),
available at http://news.airwise.com/stories/2000/O2/950102515.html.
31 Statement by Jim Hall, supra note 29.
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stabilizer, and the grease applied to it.32 The jackscrew is a 2-
foot-long, 1 '/2-inch-diameter threaded shaft that moves up and
down through a stationary gimbal nut to adjust the stabilizer.
The NTSB is investigating whether the type of grease used on
the jackscrew may have caused a breakdown of the metal in the
mechanism, or may have formed a pasty substance that picked
up dirt and other foreign material that acted like a grinding
compound on the jackscrew.3 3 A Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA) official testified at the NTSB hearing that the FAA
could not provide any history on how the jackscrew assembly was
approved, nor could they locate records of the process under
which the part received approval.34 Following the accident, the
FAA ordered an inspection of those assemblies for more than
1000 MD-80 aircraft in the U.S. commercial fleet.
Investigators have also focused on a small control piece called
an "end stop," which may have broken off the horizontal stabi-
lizer mechanism. Boeing, which purchased McDonnell Douglas
in 1997, has argued that the end stop fell off on impact.35 There
are questions regarding the service life of the end stop, and the
apparent lack of redundancy. There have also been allegations
that the decision of the flight crew not to land when the
problems first surfaced was a contributing cause. The flight
lasted approximately 2 hours and 45 minutes before it crashed.
Although the governor of Washington sought to move the
NTSB's hearing from Washington, D.C., to Seattle or some-
where else on the West Coast, the hearing took place in D.C.
during the week of December 11, 2000.36
At least 50 wrongful-death claims are a part of the MDL action
in the U.S. District Court in San Francisco. The cases have been
assigned to Judge Charles Legge. Alaska Airlines, Boeing, Shell,
and Equilon Enterprises (manufacturer of the grease allegedly
used on the jackscrew) have been named as defendants. Pre-
32 Airwise News, Alaska Crash Hearing Continues (Dec. 14, 2000), available at
http://news.airwise.com/stories/2000/12/97679741 .html.
33 Airwise News, Safety Checks on Alaska MD-80 Jackscrew Lubrication (Aug. 20,
2000), available at http://news.airwise.com/stories/2000/08/966769065.html.
34 AVweb News Wire, Alaska Airlines Flight 261: The Hearings (Dec. 18, 2000),
available at http://www.avweb.com/newswire/news0051a.html.
35 Airwise News, Boeing in the Frame in Alaska Airlines Crash Probe (Nov. 20,
2000), available at http://news.airwise.com/stories/2000/11/974726923.html.
36 Air Disaster.Com News, NTSB Declines to Move Alaska Air Hearing to Seattle
(Nov. 13, 2000), available at http://www.airdisaster.com/news/1100/13/
news.shtml.
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filing administrative claims have been filed with the FAA alleg-
ing lack of oversight.
Alaska Airlines has offered to pay 100% of compensatory dam-
ages to settle all cases under applicable law.3 7 This offer extends
not only to passengers covered by the Warsaw Convention, but
to the crew cases and non-ticketed airline employees. Alaska
Airlines has already paid $135,000 for each of the passengers
covered by the Warsaw Convention.
Defendants Boeing and Alaska Airlines have filed motions to
determine choice of law and to dismiss punitive damage claims.
Plaintiffs' response to these motions presents several arguments
regarding choice of law, including application of general mari-
time law because the accident allegedly occurred in navigable
waters. Application of maritime law would allow plaintiffs to
pursue claims for pre-impact pain and suffering, while applica-
tion of California law would preclude such claims because Cali-
fornia law has no survival action for wrongful death.38
Application of maritime law might also allow plaintiffs to pursue
claims for punitive damages. A hearing date on these motions is
to take place in March 2001. The parties have served discovery
requests, but the court has not yet set a response date.
V. EGYPTAIR FLIGHT 990 (OCTOBER 31, 1999)
On October 31, 1999, EgyptAir Flight 990, a flight from New
York to Cairo, crashed in the Atlantic Ocean about 60 miles
south of Nantucket Island, Massachusetts. The aircraft crashed
into 250 feet of water, and approximately 90 percent of the
wreckage by weight was recovered. All 217 people on board the
Boeing 767-366ER airplane were killed in the crash. The flight
had 199 passengers, 15 crewmembers, and three non-revenue
employees. Passengers were from Canada, Egypt, Germany, Su-
dan, Syria, the United States, and Zimbabwe.
The last contact with the aircraft was approximately three
minutes before the crash. There was no distress call. Radar data
showed that during the last 37 seconds of the flight, the 767
aircraft descended abruptly from 33,000 feet to 16,000 feet,
37 Airwise News, Alaska Offers to Pay Compensation Awards to Flight 261 Families
(Sept. 22, 2000), available at http://news.airwise.com/stories/2000/09/
969613370.html.
38 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 377.34, 377.61 (West 2001).
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climbed back to 24,000 feet, and then began its final plunge.-9
It is believed that the aircraft began breaking up over the Atlan-
tic Ocean at 10,000 feet. Data show that the aircraft reached its
maximum nose-down pitch of 40 degrees, and stayed at that an-
gle for four seconds. The 767 did not go supersonic but did
reach Mach .94.40 The flight data recorder also showed that the
speed brakes were deployed.
There has been much speculation concerning the cause of
the crash. Although the prevailing theory appears to be that the
first officer deliberately crashed the aircraft, the Egyptian Gov-
ernment and EgyptAir have absolved the first officer and
blamed the crash on mechanical problems.4' Similarly, attor-
neys representing various crewmembers maintain that some sort
of mechanical problem or other difficulty could have caused the
crash. They point out that it cannot be proven that the first
officer was ever alone in the cockpit; even if he were, he would
have locked the cockpit door following the captain's departure
if he intended to bring down the aircraft.42
The NTSB has yet to issue a probable cause for the accident,
and the investigation is ongoing. The Board opened the public
docket and has released a number of factual reports.43 The
Board determined that there was no need for a public hearing
but has emphasized that no determination on the cause of the
crash has been made. It is anticipated that a draft report will be
circulated among the parties for comment in the spring of 2001.
Carol Carmody, Vice Chairman of the NTSB, has said that the
draft report is "probably not going to make [Egyptian authori-
ties] happy."44
The NTSB released 1655 pages on the crash, which listed all
the evidence recovered in the investigation, including an inter-
39 AVweb News Wire, And Painful Memories Remain from Other Airline Tragedies:
EgyptAir Flight 990 Remembered (Oct. 30, 2000), available at http://
www.avweb.com/newswire/news0044a.html.
40 Avweb News Wire, NTSB Disputes Reports of What Was Said (Nov. 22, 1999),
available at http://www.avweb.com/newswire/news9947a.html.
41 Id.
42 AVweb News Wire, EgyptAir 990, The Never-Ending Story (June 26, 2000), avail-
able at http://www.avweb.com/newswire/news0026a.html.
43 The docket is available on the web page for the NTSB, http://
www.ntsb.gov/events/EA990/default.htm (visited Aug. 16, 2001).
44 Airsafetyonline, EgyptAir Report Won't Please Egyptians-Official (Mar. 12,
2001), available at http://www.airsafetyonline.com/news/2001/03/12/1.shtmi.
2001] 1377
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
pretation of the cockpit voice recording.45 On the recording,
the captain and first officer were alone in the cockpit when the
captain left to use the restroom. Translators heard a word that
was unintelligible, and then believe the first officer repeated the
phrase, "I rely on God" eight times during a long series of
thumps and clicks. Early reports that the first officer was heard
to say, "I made my decision now. I put my faith in God's hands,"
were incorrect. The DFDR shows the autopilot was switched off
and the engines shut down at this time. The captain returned
and said, "What's happening? What's happening?," according to
translators. The first officer did not answer him but again said,
"I rely on God," as the thumps and clicks continued. The cap-
tain again asked him what was happening: "What is this? What is
this? Did you shut the engines? Get away in the engines. Shut
the engines." The first officer said, "It's shut." The CVR tran-
script indicates the captain responded: "Pull. Pull with me. Pull
with me. Pull with me," before the plane crashed.
The final seconds of the aircraft's DFDR show that the eleva-
tor controls at the captain's position were set for a nose-up posi-
tion, while the controls at the first officer's position were set for
a nose-down position. The final readout shows that the elevator
controls were back to normal when the recorder stopped.
The materials released to date contain some suggestions for a
motive by the first officer, including his impending mandatory
retirement and some unusual allegations of sexual misconduct
from the staff at the New York hotel where the flight crew had
stayed.
A number of the passengers were returning to Egypt on
round-trip tickets purchased in Egypt. Under Article 28 of the
Warsaw Convention, there is no treaty jurisdiction in the United
States for those cases. Most of those cases have settled.
Some of those passengers, along with various crewmembers,
have brought suit against Boeing (the aircraft's manufacturer),
Pratt & Whitney (the engine manufacturer), and Parker Han-
nifin, Corp. for alleged mechanical defects. Pratt & Whitney has
since been dismissed. In addition, various crewmembers have
45 Translation of the cockpit voice recorded (CVR) took 130 hours and was
accomplished by an NTSB contract interpreter, an FBI language specialist, mem-
bers of the Egyptian delegation, and a State Department official. All participants,
including the Egyptian Civil Aviation Authority and EgyptAir agreed to the trans-




brought direct actions against EgyptAir because there is no
worker's compensation bar under Egyptian law.
In cases against EgyptAir where jurisdiction in the United
States is proper, the Judicial Panel on Multi-district Litigation
transferred those cases to Judge Frederic Block in the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of New York.
It appears that the amendment to the Death on the High Seas
Act (DOHSA) applies to this case. Under the amendment,
plaintiffs can recover for loss of care, comfort, and companion-
ship, as well as traditional pecuniary losses.
EgyptAir initially announced that the International Air Trans-
port Association (LATA) Intercarrier Agreement of 1997, which
waives the airline's liability limit under the Warsaw Convention,
would not bind it. EgyptAir had signed the agreement, but had
not filed a tariff incorporating the Agreement with the Depart-
ment of Transportation, as required by Transportation Depart-
ment regulations.4 6 EgyptAir later changed its position and
agreed to be bound by the agreement.47 This comports with the
ruling of Judge Hupp (Central District of California) in the case
arising out of the crash of Korean Airlines Flight 801 in Guam.
Judge Hupp held that the airline's signature on the agreement,
and the proclamation by the Director General of IATA that the
agreement had taken effect, were sufficient to constitute an ef-
fective waiver of the damage limitation by the airline, regardless
whether the airline filed the tariff.48
EgyptAir announced in February 2001 that it will not contest
liability and is willing to compensate some of the passengers
under applicable law. This offer applies only to those cases in
which jurisdiction and venue are proper in the United States.
The airline has reserved its right to claims against other parties
it believes caused the accident. Prior to EgyptAir's announce-
ment, some preliminary liability discovery had taken place.
VI. AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 1420 (JUNE 1, 1999)
On June 1, 1999, American Airlines Flight 1420, an MD-82,
overran the end of the runway while attempting to land in Little
46 See generally Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The Egyptair Crash:
A First View of the Law, 222 N.Y.L.J. 114 (1999).
47 Lee S. Kreindler, Millenium to Bring Revolution in Compensating Airline Crash
Victims, 224 N.Y.L.J. 81 (2000).
48 In re Air Crash at Agana, Guam, Civ. No. 97-7023, MDL No. 1237 (C.D. Cal.
Oct. 19, 1998); cf Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301(2d Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 150 L. Ed. 2d 716, 121 S. Ct. 2549 (2001).
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Rock, Arkansas. Of the 145 people on board, 11 were killed,
including the captain, and many others were injured.
Before and after takeoff, the flight crew received reports of
thunderstorms in the Little Rock area, including a Convective
SIGMET. Upon their first communication with the Little Rock
Air Traffic Control Tower, the controller informed them that a
thunderstorm was moving through the area. The winds were
gusting up to 44 knots at that time.49
The crew was planning to land on Runway 22L but, after the
winds shifted, they decided to land on Runway 4R. The crew
attempted a visual approach, but the captain lost visual refer-
ence to the runway. The crew then accepted vectors to the ILS
approach. The Runway Visual Range (RVR) dropped to 3000
feet, and then to 1600 feet as the crew continued with the land-
ing. Wind gusts increased to 45 knots, and the controller issued
several windshear alerts and a report of heavy rain. Less than
500 feet above ground, the aircraft was blown off course by the
strong crosswind. The plane landed in a crab position and im-
mediately began to hydroplane on the runway. The surviving
pilot described feeling a "tail slap" sensation as the strong cross-
wind pushed the aircraft on the runway. The pilots were unable
to maintain directional control. The captain used reverse thrust
in an effort to control the direction of the aircraft. The spoilers
on the aircraft were not deployed. The crew did not regain con-
trol of the aircraft by the end of the runway, and the aircraft
overran the runway, struck a landing light stanchion, broke
apart, and caught fire.
Plaintiffs sued American Airlines in both state and federal
court. State cases were filed in Arkansas, Texas, and Illinois.
The federal cases have been consolidated for MDL proceedings
in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas
before Judge Henry Woods. Plaintiffs allege that the negligence
of American Airlines includes permitting the flight to depart de-
spite fatigued pilots, attempting the approach and landing in
dangerous weather conditions, failing to divert to a suitable al-
ternate airport when advised of weather conditions at the Little
Rock airport, failing to properly configure the aircraft on land-
ing, and failing to establish and enforce policies and procedures
relating to operation in areas of known or forecast thunder-
storms, convective weather activity, and wind shear.





Although the flight was domestic, there were a number of pas-
sengers returning from international trips whose claims fall
under the Warsaw Convention. American Airlines waived the
defense that it took "all necessary measures to avert the disaster
or that it was impossible for it to take such measures," and thus
agreed, under the International Air Transport Association
(JATA) Intercarrier Agreement, to absolute liability for compen-
satory damages for the international passengers.
Judge Woods ruled that punitive damages are barred in the
Warsaw cases, following decisions of the Second, Eleventh, and
D.C. circuits. 50 The court noted that the Eighth Circuit had not
addressed the issue.
American sought leave to file third-party complaints against
both the air traffic controller and the United States. Judge
Woods permitted suit against the Government, but not the con-
troller, in domestic (non-Warsaw) cases only.51 The Court ruled
that there was no right of contribution for American against the
United States under Arkansas law for those cases involving the
passengers covered by Warsaw and the IATA agreement. Judge
Woods reasoned that because the Warsaw claims arose in con-
tract, not in negligence, and Arkansas did not recognize a right
to contribution in contract cases, American could not bring con-
tribution claims in those actions.52 Arkansas law does not allow
for a right of contribution when one party is liable in tort and
the other in contract. The court found that this law applied
even though the IATA agreement reserved the right of an air-
line for contribution and indemnity.
The court also ruled that American's cause of action for in-
demnity did not arise until the claim or judgment was paid, and
there was no good reason to accelerate those claims. The court
did allow American to go forward with its third-party claims
against the United States in the non-Warsaw cases. Judge Woods
ordered the Warsaw cases to proceed to trial ahead of the gen-
eral liability proceedings. The first two personal injury cases
were tried to Arkansas juries in the summer of 2000.
50 In re Air Crash at Little Rock, Ark., on June 1, 1999, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1022,
1024 (E.D. Ark. 2000).
51 Because American Airlines conceded that the controller was, at all times,
acting within the scope of his employment as a federal employee, the controller
had complete immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679. In
re Air Crash at Little Rock, Ark., 109 F. Supp. 2d at 1025.
52 Id.
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In the first case, Maddox v. American Airlines, the jury returned
a verdict of $11,015,000 for a young woman who suffered burn
injuries and will be unable to pursue her career as an opera
singer.53
In the second case, Lloyd v. American Airlines, the jury returned
a verdict of $6,500,000.5' The plaintiff, another young woman,
suffered minor physical injuries. Her primary damage was Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). At trial, American Airlines
moved for judgment as a matter of law on the ground that
Lloyd's PTSD was not proximately caused by physical injuries
suffered in the crash, and thus, under Eastern Airlines, Inc. v.
Floyd,55 she could not recover damages for her PTSD under the
Warsaw Convention. Judge Woods disagreed, distinguishing
Floyd and holding that, once the threshold of liability has been
crossed by a passenger in a Warsaw case (through physical in-
jury, however minor), then all damages available under the law
of the passenger's domicile are recoverable, including damages
for mental injuries.56 Although holding that a sufficient nexus
between physical and mental injuries need not be established,
Judge Woods nonetheless found a connection between Lloyd's
physical and mental injuries because the physical injuries were
"all part of a terrifying accident which led to the plaintiff's
PTSD. ' 7 Finally, Judge Woods noted that there was evidence in
the record that PTSD itself constitutes a physical manifestation
of injury. According to the plaintiff's psychiatrist, studies have
shown that PTSD causes biological and physical changes in
brain function.58 On December 8, 2000, Judge Woods denied
American Airlines' motion for a new trial in the Lloyd case.
Both cases are on appeal before the Eighth Circuit on a num-
ber of issues, including whether the trial court erred in refusing
to award pre-judgment interest. American is appealing the trial
court's denial of its motion to file a third-party complaint seek-
ing contribution against the United States in the Warsaw cases.
53 American Airlines Admits Negligence in Fatal Crash: But Company Fighting Puni-
tive Damages, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 30, 2000, available at 2000 WL
29776098. The case number is Civ. No. 00-135.
54 Id. The case number is Civ. No. 00-300.
55 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
56 Lloyd v. Am. Airlines, 118 F. Supp.2d 916, 921 (E.D. Ark. 2000).
57 Id. at 923.




On November 29, 2000, American admitted that its negli-
gence was a contributing cause of the accident. American thus
agreed not to contest liability for compensatory damages in non-
Warsaw cases. American continues to vigorously deny that it is
responsible or liable for any punitive or exemplary damages. As
of December 11, 2000, approximately one-half of the cases filed
had been settled. Judge Woods scheduled damage trials in al-
most all remaining cases at a rate of about four cases per month
running from February to July 2001.
The punitive damage trial has been postponed until the com-
pletion of all damages trials. This decision was based, in part,
on the fact that many passengers had not yet filed suit and Ar-
kansas law provides for only one punitive damage trial.
C. CLAiMs AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
American Airlines briefly brought the United States into the
lawsuit as a third party defendant, alleging that the actions of
the air traffic controller caused or contributed to the accident.
Specifically, American Airlines alleged that the United States
was partly to blame for the accident because it allegedly dissemi-
nated inaccurate information about the weather, the runway
condition, and the approach. In addition to joining the United
States in the federal cases, American brought third-party actions
in Arkansas and Texas state courts, anticipating that the United
States would remove those cases to federal court.
In the Arkansas state court cases, American filed third-party
complaints against both the United States and the individual air
traffic controller on duty at the Little Rock Air Traffic Control
Tower at the time of the accident. The United States substi-
tuted itself for its employee and removed those cases to federal
court, pursuant to the Westfall Act.59
In the Texas state court cases, American sought leave to add
the air traffic controller and the United States as third parties.
The United States filed an amicus brief opposing the request
and argued the state court lacked jurisdiction over the claims
against the controller because, based on American's own allega-
tions, he was acting within the scope of his employment at the
time of the accident. The Government further argued that the
state court lacked jurisdiction against the United States as a mat-
59 Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000).
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ter of law. The presiding judge denied American's request for
leave to add the controller, but allowed American to file third-
party complaints against the United States directly. The United
States filed a motion to dismiss those complaints for lack ofjuris-
diction, and American non-suited the cases.
In the federal cases, the United States moved for summary
judgment in lieu of an answer. The United States argued that
the sole proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of
American Airlines, and that the actions of the air traffic control-
ler did not cause or contribute to the cause of the accident.
On November 29, 2000, American voluntarily dismissed the
United States from the case without prejudice, and on Decem-
ber 5, 2000, Judge Woods signed the order dismissing the
United States.
VII. SWISSAIR FLIGHT 111 (SEPTEMBER 2, 1998)
On September 2, 1998, Swissair Flight 111 crashed into the
Atlantic Ocean off Peggy's Cove, Nova Scotia, killing all 229 peo-
ple on board. The flight departed from JFK Airport in New
York and was headed to Geneva, Switzerland. Approximately
one hour after the flight departed, at 33,000 feet, the crew re-
ported smoke in the cockpit and requested an immediate return
to Boston. About one minute later, the crew changed its re-
quested destination to Halifax, Nova Scotia. Ten minutes after
first announcing "Pan, Pan, Pan," the crew declared an emer-
gency, began dumping fuel, and stated, "[W] e have to land im-
mediately." No further communications were received from the
flight and it disappeared from radar approximately six minutes
later.
The Canadian Transportation Safety Board is investigating
the accident. The Board found evidence of an in-flight fire and
is now focusing on where, why, and how the fire started. The
investigation has identified extensive fire damage in an area
above the ceiling sometimes referred to as the "attic," in the
front section of the aircraft within an area extending about 1.5
meters forward and 5 meters aft of the cockpit wall. The flight
suffered a near-total electrical failure five minutes prior to im-
pact. Although the origin of the fire has not been determined,
the Board believes that shortcomings in design and equipment,
and crew training, awareness, procedures, and checklists may
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have deterred prompt detection and suppression of this in-flight
fire.60
On December 4, 2000, the Board issued five interim aviation
safety recommendations dealing with in-flight firefighting mea-
sures. In issuing the recommendations, the Board noted that
approximately 20 minutes elapsed from the time the Flight 111
crew detected an unusual odor until the aircraft crashed, and
about 11 minutes elapsed between the time the presence of
smoke was confirmed by the crew and the time the fire was
known to have begun to adversely affect the aircraft systems.
The Board has announced that its final report may be issued in
the spring of 2001 and will likely include new recommendations
regarding aircraft wiring and insulation.6' The investigation re-
covered two million pieces of individual wreckage, and more
than 170 miles of the MD-i1's wiring. More than $1 million in
U.S. currency was recovered from the aircraft wreckage, and
there may be as much as $300 million in jewels remaining in the
cargo.
The majority of the lawsuits have been filed in the United
States, naming Swissair, McDonnell Douglas Corp., the Boeing
Company (McDonnell's successor in interest), and Delta Air
Lines, Inc., (Swissair's domestic partner) as defendants. Some
lawsuits were brought and settled in Switzerland.
The U.S. cases are consolidated before Chief Judge Giles of
the U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania for MDL
proceedings. Defendants Swissair and Boeing entered into a
sharing agreement and agreed not to contest liability for com-
pensatory damages. They also filed several motions, including
whether DOHSA applies to an accident that occurred in Cana-
dian territorial waters, and whether the French and Swiss plain-
tiffs' claims should be dismissed on the basis of forum non
conveniens. The defendants also moved to dismiss all claims for
damages not recoverable under DOHSA, including claims for
punitive damages.
Judge Giles has taken the motions under submission but has
not yet issued rulings, seeking instead to encourage settlement
through the uncertainty over the outcome of the pending mo-
tions. This approach has had some success because many of the
- Updates on the Canadian Transportation Board's investigation are available
at http://www.tsb.gc.ca.
61 AVweb News Wire, And Swissair Probe Nears End (Nov. 6, 2000), available at
http://www.avweb.com/newswire/news0045a.html.
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cases have since settled and any ruling on the motions would, as
of March 2001, apply only to a few cases. The cases are under-
going mediation before Judge Giles and otherjudges and magis-
trates in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The cases are
presently being mediated under the assumption that DOHSA
applies to this accident. Of the 215 actions, 123 have settled,
and settlement negotiations are ongoing.
VIII. SILKAIR M1185 (DECEMBER 19, 1997)
On December 19, 1997, a SilkAir Boeing 737-300 suddenly
plunged from cruise flight and crashed into the Musi River, kill-
ing all 104 people on board. SilkAir is the regional arm of Sin-
gapore Airlines, and was on a flight from Jakarta to Singapore
when it crashed. The flight was cruising at 35,000 feet when
radar controllers observed the flight enter a steep dive; the air-
craft traveled at speeds in excess of Mach 1 during its dive. The
weather was reportedly good, the aircraft was less than one year
old, there was no evidence of terrorism, and no distress call was
received. The engines were apparently developing power at the
time of the crash. Indonesian authorities investigated the crash.
Some involved in the investigation have suggested a possible
murder-suicide by one of the pilots. 62 The flight data recorder
and CVR were disabled before the crash, but reportedly showed
no signs of "unusual behavior. 1' s
In December 2000, Indonesian authorities investigating the
accident concluded that no cause could be determined "due to
the highly fragmented wreckage and the nearly total lack of use-
ful data, information and evidence."64 The Singapore police
and Indonesia's National Transportation Safety Committee is-
sued separate statements that the pilot showed no suicidal ten-
dencies. The final report stated that "no evidence [was] found
to indicate that the performance of either pilot was adversely
affected by any medical or psychological conditions. 65
In contrast, Jim Hall, then Chairman of the NTSB, stated in a
letter to Indonesian authorities that the evidence developed
during the investigation suggests that there was nothing
62 William M. Carley & Diane Brady, If 1997 SilkAir Crash Was Suicidal, Here
Might Be the Reasons, WALL ST. J., July 30, 1998, at Al, available at 1998 WL-WSJ
3503657.






mechanically wrong with the 737, and that "the accident can be
explained by intentional pilot action. 66 He said the flight path
of the aircraft strongly suggested a sustained and manual manip-
ulation of the controls. Mr. Hall noted that the investigation
showed the captain had a serious debt problem due to financial-
market speculation and had experienced run-ins with airline
management. 67 Mr. Hall's letter claimed that "a significant
amount of pertinent factual information developed during the
three-year investigation is either not discussed in the [Indone-
sian] report or not fully considered." 68 He added that it was
probable that the captain turned off the CVR and DFDR before
the crash.69 The Indonesian authorities did not amend their re-
port based on the letter from Chairman Hall.
The pilot was a former member of the Singapore Air Force
aerobatic team. It was reported that he had taken out several
large life insurance policies weeks before the accident. He also
had reportedly been disciplined previously by the airline for de-
activating a CVR.70
Some lawsuits have been brought in Singapore against the air-
line. Approximately thirty of those cases have settled.71 SilkAir
has reportedly offered $200,000 in compensation to each family,
which it hopes will settle the remaining claims.72
Approximately fifty-five lawsuits are pending in the United
States against Boeing, the accident aircraft's manufacturer, and
other defendants, including United Airlines, ITT Aerospace
Controls, Kavilico Corp., Parker Hannifin Corp., and Honeywell
Inc. Those suits were originally filed in Ohio, New York, and
Delaware, but were transferred by the MDL panel to ChiefJudge
John C. Coughenour in the Western District of Washington.
Plaintiffs allege that the crash occurred due to an uncom-
manded rudder deflection of the 737. Plaintiffs complain that
the 737's rudder was defective, similar to the allegations in the
United Airlines Flight 585 accident in Colorado Springs, Colo-
66 Don Phillips, Pilot May Have Meant to Crash Asian Jet; 97 Silk Air Disaster "Prob-




70 AVweb News Wire, "Suicidal Pilot" Cause of SilkAir Crash? (Aug. 30, 1999),
available at http://www.avweb.com/newswire/news9935.html.
71 Airwise News, SilkAir Crash Suits Filed Against Boeing (Dec. 8, 1999), available
at http://news.airwise.com.
72 AVweb News Wire, SilkAir Ups Compensation Offer (Nov. 22, 1999), available at
http://www.avweb.com/newswire/news9947a.html.
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rado, and the USAir Flight 427 accident near Aliquippa, Penn-
sylvania. The hull insurer has also filed suit in federal court in
New York against Boeing, Parker Hannifin, Honeywell, and
others, alleging that defects in the 737 caused the accident. 73
Boeing's motion to have the cases dismissed on forum non
conveniens grounds was denied by Order dated January 6, 2000.
Judge Coughenour noted that courts rarely disturb the pre-
sumption in favor of a plaintiffs chosen forum, and that a de-
fendant seeking dismissal has a substantial burden to meet.7 1
The court found the two alternative forums suggested by Boe-
ing, Indonesia and Singapore, to be adequate.75 The court went
on to hold, however, that neither the private nor public factors
clearly demonstrated that the trial would be more fairly or effi-
ciently litigated if conducted in a different forum. 76 Specifically,
the court found that a significant portion of the evidence and
witnesses related to the plaintiffs' theory of liability (design de-
fect of the rudder) was in Washington, the place where the air-
craft was designed. The court found that although Boeing
made some showing that the evidence supporting its defense
was more accessible in Indonesia or Singapore, the court did
not believe the burden Boeing faced was out of proportion to
the benefit afforded by plaintiffs by litigating in Washington.77
The court further noted that at least three of the crash victims
whose relatives brought claims were United States citizens. The
court ruled that it must be particularly deferential to the plain-
tiffs choice of forum when the plaintiff is a U.S. citizen. To
further justify the expenditure of public resources on this case,
the court noted that the Boeing 737 carries a great number of
people into and out of its district, the Western District of Wash-
ington, every day. Thus, the public interest supported keeping
the suit in its district. The judge declined to address issues in
Boeing's motion concerning choice of law or the applicability of
DOHSA because those issues were not fully briefed or ripe for
decision.
In addition, Boeing unsuccessfully sought to remove to fed-
eral court several actions pending in California state court. Al-
73 Airwise News, Silk Air Insurers Sue Boeing (Dec. 18, 2000), available at http://
news.airwise.com/stories/2000/12/977171451 .html.
74 In re Air Crash Disaster Near Palembang, Indonesia on Dec. 19, 1997, MDL
No. 1276 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 14, 2000).
75 Id. at 2.
76 Id. at 6.
77 Id. at 2-3.
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though Boeing claimed that DOHSA presented federal
questions, U.S. District Judge Coughenour rejected that argu-
ment as a basis for removal and remanded the cases to state
court.
IX. KOREAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 801 (AUGUST 6,1997)
On August 6, 1997, Korean Airlines Flight 801, a Boeing 747,
crashed into the side of a hill three miles short of the runway at
Agana, Guam, killing 229 passengers and crew members. Only
twenty-six people survived. At the time of the crash, there were
heavy rain showers in the area with layers of clouds and flight
visibilities of one to seven miles. As Flight 801 finished crossing
a portion of the Pacific Ocean, the Korean crew contacted the
Guam Combined Enroute Radar Approach Control (CERAP),
an FAA radar air traffic control facility that handles both en-
route, high-altitude aircraft, and aircraft on approach for
landing.
After providing radar vectors to position the aircraft to inter-
cept the final approach course, the CERAP air traffic controller
cleared the aircraft for an instrument approach to Runway 6
Left. Normally, this would have been an ILS approach, but the
glide slope was out of service for a site upgrade. The KAL flight
crew had been advised of this outage prior to the flight. The
CERAP controller also reminded them of the outage as part of
their approach clearance. The crew had to perform a localizer-
only approach, which requires adherence to a series of "step-
down" altitudes.
After positioning the aircraft to intercept the approach, the
CERAP controller instructed the KAL crew to contact Agana
Tower, run by independent contractor Serco under contract to
the FAA, for its landing clearance. After switching communica-
tions to the tower, the flight crew began a steady descent, did
not follow the step-down procedure, and struck the hilltop 3.3
miles short of the runway at an altitude of about 600 feet above
Mean Sea Level (MSL) at a point where the minimum altitude
for the approach was 1,440 feet MSL. The crew continued its
descent, despite a number of altitude alarms and ground prox-
imity warnings in the cockpit that should have alerted them to
their unsafe proximity to the terrain.
A tool that could have alerted the CERAP controller of Flight
801's altitude deviations is the Minimum Safe Altitude Warning
system (MSAW), a computerized radar feature that issues an au-
dible and visual alert to the controller when an aircraft gets be-
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low certain altitudes, which was inhibited on the day of the
accident and had been so for some time prior to the accident.
The facility had allegedly experienced a number of nuisance
alarms and the facility manager had ordered the system
inhibited.
The NTSB determined that the probable cause of the acci-
dent was "the captain's failure to adequately brief and execute
the nonprecision approach and [the crew's] failure to effectively
monitor and cross-check the captain's execution of the ap-
proach." The NTSB also found the FAA's "intentional inhibi-
tion of the minimum safe altitude warning system at Guam and
the agency's failure to adequately manage the system" a contrib-
uting factor to the accident.
Plaintiffs sued Korean Airlines (KAL), Serco Management
Services, and the United States. Suits were filed in several differ-
ent U.S. District Courts, with the greatest number of suits
brought in the Central District of California. The MDL panel
consolidated the cases for pretrial discovery before Judge Harry
L. Hupp in the Central District of California.
A. WARSAW CONVENTION ISSUES
Because most of the passengers on Flight 801 were Korean
nationals traveling on round-trip tickets from Seoul, the Warsaw
Convention governs the majority of the plaintiffs' claims against
KAL. Early in the litigation, Judge Hupp made two significant
rulings concerning the application of the Warsaw Convention to
KAL.
First, Judge Hupp ruled that the Warsaw limitation on liability
($75,000 pursuant to the Montreal Agreement) had been
waived by KAL and that KAL had instead agreed to be bound by
the provisions of the IATA Intercarrier Agreement. 78 Pursuant
to the IATA agreement, KAL was strictly liable for compensatory
damages up to 100,000 Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), about
$135,000, and unlimited liability if it could not prove that it took
all necessary measures to avoid the crash.
Second, Judge Hupp ruled that, although the Korean plain-
tiffs could not sue KAL directly in the United States, the provi-
sions of the Warsaw Convention did not preclude the United
States from maintaining claims against KAL for indemnity, con-
78 Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
150 L. Ed. 2d 716, 121 S. Ct. 2549 (2001).
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tribution, and apportionment of fault.7 KAL had moved to dis-
miss the indemnity and contribution claims brought by Serco
and the United States, arguing that the Warsaw Convention ap-
plies to all claims, however founded, arising from an accident
occurring in international transportation, and that there is no
treaty jurisdiction for contribution and indemnity claims in the
United States. In denying the motion, the court held that "the
Convention covers only passenger injury or death claims (or the
claims of freight shippers, not involved here)." The court found
that the indemnity claims of Serco and the United States were
independent of the passenger injury or death claims and there-
fore not governed by the requirements of Article 28 of the War-
saw Convention. The court observed that the "traditional use of
indemnity claims has differentiated them from the basis of a
personal injury claim out of which it may spring." Relying on
the Sixth Circuit's decision in Polec v. Northwest Airlines,80 the
court found that, although the indemnity claims at issue in this
litigation are separate from the claims brought on behalf of the
passengers and not subject to Article 28, "to the extent that the
indemnity claim is for protection from passenger damage claims
which exceed the limits of liability provided under the Conven-
tion for personal injuries to passengers, the indemnity claim
must be limited by the Convention to the amount that the car-
rier has to pay under those limits. ""'
B. DAMAGES ISSUES
Trial was set to begin in May 2000. Before trial commenced,
however, the defendants entered into a sharing agreement, by
which all plaintiffs would be paid full compensatory damages
without the need for a determination on liability.
1. Venue
Under the Supreme Court decision, Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg
Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, MDL cases must be returned to
their transferor courts for trials on both liability and damages.82
The sharing agreement avoided returning the cases for liability
trials, but damage trials remained.
79 In re Air Crash at Agana, Guam, No. 98-ml-7211, MDL No. 1237 (C.D. Cal.
Jan. 25, 1999).
80 86 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 1996).
81 In re Air Crash at Agana, Guam, No. 98-ml-7211, MDL No. 1237 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 18, 2000).
82 523 U.S. 26 (1998).
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Lawsuits against the United States under the Federal Torts
Claims Act (FTCA)"3 may be brought only in the judicial district
where the plaintiff resides or where the alleged act or omission
occurred. 4 With a few exceptions, plaintiffs did not reside in
the Central District of California. The United States filed a mo-
tion to dismiss, or in the alternative, to transfer all of the cases
filed in the Central District of California to the District of Guam
for damage trials.
The court granted the request that the cases be transferred to
the District of Guam upon completion of pretrial proceedings
in the Central District.85 The court found that the United States
had not waived its venue objection by participating in discovery
in the Central District because the MDL panel pursuant to stat-
ute, mandated it. Similarly, Judge Hupp ruled that the United
States did not waive its venue objection by agreeing to partici-
pate in the liability trial in the Central District.
Lastly the court found that "weight of the contacts," not the
"substantial contacts," test was the appropriate test to determine
whether venue can lie in more than one district in an FTCA
case. Plaintiffs argued that some activity relating to FAA negli-
gence had taken place at the FAA's regional office in Los Ange-
les and amounted to substantial contacts sufficient to lay venue
in the Central District. Using the weight-of-the-contacts test, the
court found that venue lies in the District of Guam.
Fifteen cases have not been settled and remain subject to the
transfer order. These cases will be transferred once pretrial
matters have been completed in the Central District. The re-
maining cases will stay in the Central District, but will likely be
assigned to other judges for trial.
2. Choice of Law
The threshold damages issue concerned which law would ap-
ply to individual cases. Plaintiffs argued for the application of
Guam law, while the defendants argued for the application of
Korean law. Under Korean law, courts generally cap non-eco-
nomic damages in wrongful-death cases at $45,000.
Judge Hupp noted that foreign law may be defined as what
foreign courts actually do in particular situations, and ruled that
83 Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (West 1994 & Supp. 2000).
84 Id. § 1402(b).




Korean law applied to damages issues where the victim was a
Korean domiciliary.8 6
In coming to his decision, Judge Hupp considered the choice-
of-law rules for both California and Guam. He applied Guam's
choice-of-law rules to the cases originally filed in Guam and to
all cases involving the United States. Guam follows the Restate-
ment of Conflicts approach to choice of law-the "most signifi-
cant relationship" test. Applying that test, the court held that
Korean law would apply to damages issues for Korean decedents
and their heirs.
The court found that the laws of Korea were broader in scope
concerning the range of permissible claimants. For example,
Korean law provides for claims to be brought on behalf of the
decedent, the decedent's heirs, and other persons who suffer an
economic or emotional loss. The range of permissible plaintiffs
in Guam would have been much smaller.
The parties then submitted briefs on Korean damages law,
supported by affidavits from Korean legal experts. Judge Hupp
synthesized these into a primer. The primer outlines the meth-
odology Korean courts use to determine proper claimants and
to calculate economic and non-economic damages in wrongful
death and personal injury cases. The primer is intended to
serve as "a framework" for use by the judges presiding over fu-
ture damages trials.
The parties submitted proposed jury instructions based on
Judge Hupp's primer. A hearing on those instructions was held
in February 2001.
As of February 2001, most of the cases have been through
some type of mediation and approximately 30 cases of the 160
remain on track for trial on damage issues only. Of those thirty
remaining cases, ten are crew cases.
X. TRANSPORTES AEREOS REGIONAIS
(OCTOBER 31, 1996)
On October 31, 1996, a Transportes Aereos Regionais (TAM)
Fokker F100 crashed shortly after departing the airport at Sao
Paulo, Brazil. An uncommanded deployment of the thrust re-
versers on the right engine is alleged to have caused the acci-
dent, which killed ninety passengers, six crewmembers, and
eight persons on the ground.
86 In re Air Crash at Agana, Guam, No. 98-ml-7211, MDL No. 1237 (C.D. Cal.
Oct. 13, 2000).
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Over sixty cases arising from this accident have been filed in
California and New York state courts. Named as defendants in
those cases are TAM, Fokker Aircraft B.V., and other Fokker en-
tities: Northrop Grumman, Teleflex Control Systems, Inc., and
Safe Flight Instrument Corp. Northrop Grumman, Teleflex,
and Safe Flight manufactured the thrust reverser and certain
component parts. TAM has moved to dismiss the cases on the
grounds that it does not do business in New York. Plaintiffs have
opposed the motion. The California state court granted one de-
fendant's motion for forum non conveniens of the Brazilian
domiciliaries to Brazil, and those cases have been stayed in the
California courts. Some discovery has been completed, includ-
ing depositions of Northrop Grumman and TAM personnel.
One case is still pending against Northrop and Teleflex in a Cal-
ifornia state court, and Fokker and TAM have been named as
third-party defendants. Depositions are being taken in this case,
but no trial date has been set. Additionally, a number of cases
have been filed against TAM in Brazil.
XI. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES FLIGHT 800
(JULY 17, 1996)
The two most significant events last year in the TWA Flight
800 litigation involve DOHSA: (1) the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court,
which held that DOHSA is not applicable to the action because
the crash occurred within federal territorial waters; and (2) on
April 5, 2000, President Clinton signed into law an amendment
to DOHSA permitting families to recover compensation for
non-economic losses including care, comfort, and companion-
ship. The amendment was retroactive to July 16, 1996, the day
before the TWA Flight 800 crash.
TWA Flight 800 exploded approximately ten minutes after
taking off from JFK International Airport in New York, bound
for Paris and Rome. The explosion caused the plane to break
apart in midair and crash into the Atlantic Ocean, approxi-
mately eight nautical miles off the shore of Long Island. All 230
passengers and crewmembers were killed.
The NTSB determined that the probable cause of the acci-
dent was the explosion of the center wing fuel tank (CWT), re-
sulting from the ignition of the flammable fuel/air mixture in
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the tank.8 7 The NTSB could not determine the source of igni-
tion energy for the explosion, but noted that the most likely
source was a "short circuit outside of the CWT that allowed ex-
cessive voltage to enter it through electrical wiring associated
with the fuel quantity indication system."'88
MDL cases are consolidated before U.S. DistrictJudge Robert
Sweet in the Southern District of New York. The defendants are
TWA, Boeing, and, in some cases, the fuel-pump manufacturer,
Hydroaire, Inc.
A. THE SECOND CIRCUIT DECISION
In July 1997, the defendants moved to dismiss all the plain-
tiffs' claims for non-pecuniary damages. The basis for the mo-
tion was DOHSA, which limits a plaintiffs recovery to pecuniary
losses where a death occurs on the high seas beyond a marine
league from shore. Judge Sweet denied the motion, ruling that
DOHSA did not apply to the case. 89 The Second Circuit
affirmed.90
DOHSA was enacted in 1920 to provide a cause of action for
wrongful deaths occurring "on the high seas beyond a marine
league" from the United States territorial shores.9 1 The purpose
of the law was to create a remedy where none existed. Maritime
law did not recognize a cause of action for wrongful death. The
law limited damages to "a fair and just compensation for the
pecuniary loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit the
suit is brought."9 2 Courts eventually applied the law to aviation
cases.
The Second Circuit interpreted "high seas" and "beyond a
marine league" to have independent meaning, ruling that both
must be met in order for DOHSA to apply.93 The parties agreed
that Flight 800 crashed beyond a marine league from the coast
of Long Island, but disputed whether the crash was "on the high
87 Aircraft Accident Report: In-flight Breakup Over the Atlantic Ocean, Trans World
Airlines Flight 800, Boeing 74 7-131, N93119, Near East Moriches, New York, July 17,
1996, available at http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2000/aar0003.htm.
88 Id.
89 See In re Air Crash Off Long Island, New York, on July 17, 1996, 1998 WL
292333 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 1998).
90 In re Air Crash Off Long Island, New York, on July 17, 1996, 209 F.3d 200
(2d Cir. 2000).
91 46 U.S.C. app. § 761 (1994).
92 Id. app. § 762.
93 In re Air Crash Off Long Island, New York, 209 F.3d at 200.
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seas." The court rejected the defendants' argument that "high
seas" refers to all waters beyond the low-water mark, ruling that
"high seas" means those waters beyond the territorial waters of
the United States.
Under Presidential Proclamation No. 5928, issued in 1988 by
President Reagan, the territorial waters of the United States ex-
tend twelve miles from the shore of the United States. As the
crash occurred eight miles from the shore, it was within the
United States' territorial waters, rather than on the "high seas."
Thus, DOHSA did not apply.
The Second Circuit's decision that Flight 800 crashed within
federal territorial waters allows the plaintiffs to pursue their
remedies under state law.
B. THE 2000 AMENDMENTS TO DOHSA
After the accident, families began lobbying Congress to
change the damage limits of DOHSA. On April 5, 2000, the
amendments became law, retroactive to July 16, 1996, the day
before the TWA Flight 800 crash. The amendment provides as
follows:
In the case of a commercial aviation accident, whenever the
death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful act, neglect, or
default occurring on the high seas 12 nautical miles or closer to
the shore of any State, or the District of Columbia, or the Territo-
ries or dependencies of the United States, this Act shall not apply
and the rules applicable under Federal, State, and other appro-
priate law shall apply.94
If, however, "the death resulted from a commercial aviation
accident occurring on the high seas beyond 12 nautical miles
from the shore of any state, or the District of Columbia, or the
territories or dependencies of the United States, additional com-
pensation for non-pecuniary damages for wrongful death of a
decedent is recoverable. '95 These non-pecuniary damages are
defined as "damages for loss of care, comfort, and
companionship."96
The amendment ends the DOHSA economic damage limita-
tion for commercial aviation disasters. Plaintiffs from TWA
Flight 800 and later commercial aviation disasters on the high
seas will be able to obtain a recovery for both economic and
94 46 U.S.C.A. app. § 761(b).




non-economic losses. Since these changes in the law, many of
the TWA Flight 800 cases have settled and settlement negotia-
tions in most other cases are actively proceeding.
C. OTHER LITIGATION EVENTS
Defendants moved to dismiss each action arising from the
death of a French domiciliary on forum non conveniens
grounds. The defendants promised the judge that they would
not contest liability for full compensatory damages in the courts
of France if the judge would grant the motion. Though noting
that their motion was a "well-crafted attempt to avoid some of
the more obvious legal barriers to a motion to dismiss on forum
non conveniens grounds," Judge Sweet denied the motion be-
cause plaintiffs chose the forum and because public interest fac-
tors favored retaining the actions in the United States.97
XII. AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 965
(DECEMBER 20, 1995)
On December 20, 1995, American Airlines Flight 965 crashed
into terrain while the crew was attempting to maneuver the air-
craft onto an approach to the Alfonso Bonilla Aragon Airport at
Cali, Colombia. One hundred and fifty-one passengers, both pi-
lots, and all six cabin crewmembers died in the crash. Four per-
sons sustained nonfatal injuries.
Following last year's reversal of the trial court's summary judg-
ment ruling in favor of the plaintiffs, 98 all the plaintiffs' cases
have settled.
In April 2000, American Airlines went to trial against Honey-
well, Inc., and Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., seeking contribution.
Honeywell supplied the aircraft's flight management computer
(FMC). Jeppesen provided the navigational database program-
med into the FMC and the corresponding aviation charts.
American Airlines alleged that a problem with "duplicate codes"
in the FMC contributed to the accident.
97 In re Air Crash Off Long Island New York, on July 17, 1996, 65 F. Supp. 2d
207, 218 (S.D. N.Y. 1999).
98 Cortes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1290 (1lth Cir. 1999) (holding
that the 1999 Montreal Protocol No. 4 clarifies the definition of willful miscon-
duct under Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention, rather than effecting a substan-
tive change in the law, and thus applied to this 1995 accident; case remanded to
determine whether the pilots knew the flight was significantly off course), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 1136 (2000).
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On June 13, 2000, a federal jury in the Southern District of
Florida decided that American Airlines was 75% at fault for the
crash, Jeppesen was 17% at fault, and Honeywell was 8% at
fault.99 Honeywell and Jeppesen recently settled with American,
although initially they argued for a new trial and complained
that American Airlines' extreme misconduct in the early stages
of the case led to unreasonably high settlements. 00
The jury apparently credited American Airlines' claim that
Jeppesen fraudulently concealed a problem with the database.
In support of its claims againstJeppesen and Honeywell, Ameri-
can showed that Jeppesen had been aware of the "duplicate
code" problem for more than five years. American argued that
Jeppesen and Honeywell had fixed twenty-two of the ninety-five
code problems in the database before the accident, but had not
told the airlines that the flaws existed.
XIII. PAN AM 103 (DECEMBER 21, 1988)
A. CRIMINAL ACTION
On December 21, 1988, Pan Am Flight 103, a Boeing 747,
exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland after a bomb on board the
aircraft detonated. The flight was en route from London
Heathrow Airport to John F. Kennedy International Airport. All
259 persons in the aircraft and 11 people on the ground were
killed.
Twelve years later, onJanuary 31, 2001, a Scottish court found
one Libyan man guilty for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103.
Charges were brought against two defendants, both former em-
ployees of Libyan Arab Airlines. Senior Libyan intelligence
agent Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi was convicted, while Lamen
Khalifa Fhimah was acquitted. Pursuant to Scottish law,
Megrahi was sentenced to life in prison but will be eligible for
parole after 20 years.
Over a period of nine months, Scottish prosecutors brought
232 witnesses to testify before the special court in the Nether-
99 Scott McCartney, Miami Jury Finds Firms Partly Liable in Colombia Crash, WALL
ST. J., June 14, 2000, at B14, available at 2000 WL-WSJ 3032875.
100 Ina Paiva Cordle, Onboard Computer Makers Reach a Settlement with American




lands on a former U.S. airbase.' 0° Although the judges found
several witnesses to be unreliable, the forensic evidence that the
bomb was first loaded onto a plane in Malta before being trans-
ferred to the Pan Am flight convinced them. Key evidence in-
cluded the testimony of a Libyan official who issued Megrahi a
coded passport in an alias on the orders of the Libyan Govern-
ment, as well as the testimony of a Maltese shopkeeper who ten-
tatively identified Megrahi as the purchaser of a distinctive set of
clothes that came from the suitcase that housed the bomb.
10 2
On February 7, 2001, Megrahi filed a notice of appeal with the
Scottish High Court in Edinburgh, Scotland.
0 3
Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi declared he would not pay
compensation to the victims' families or acknowledge official re-
sponsibility for the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103.0 Af-
ter the verdict, Gaddafi called the case "a farce."10
B. CIVIL ACTIONS
1. Plaintiffs vs. Pan Am
In July 1992, after a lengthy liability trial against Pan Am in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York, a jury found that Pan Am had committed acts of "willful
misconduct" which contributed to the crash, thus removing the
$75,000 damage limit under the Warsaw Convention. The liabil-
ity finding was affirmed on appeal.106 All claims against Pan Am
have been resolved by trial or settlement.
2. Plaintiffs vs. Libya
In 1994, plaintiffs brought suit in the Eastern District of New
York against the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the
Libyan External Security Organization, the Libyan Arab Air-
101 Kevin Whitelaw & Thomas K. Grose, Pinning Blame for a Terrorist Massacre
Split Verdict in the Pan Am 103 Bombing Trial, 130 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 6
(Feb. 12, 2001), available at 2001 WL 6319667.
102 Id.
103 Rachel Blackburn & Hugh Dougherty, Lockerbie Bomber Lodges Appeal,
WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, Feb. 7, 2001, available at 2001 WL 12261308.
104 Howard Schneider, Lockerbie Defendant Embraced by Gaddafi; Libyan Rejects
Blame, Redress for Victims, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2001, at A01.
105 Sarah El Deeb, Gadhafi Fails on Lockerbie Evidence, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 5,
2001, available at 2001 WL 11950044.
106 In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie Scot., on Dec. 21, 1988, 37 F.3d 804 (2d Cir.
1994), cert. denied sub nom. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Pagnucco, 513 U.S.
1126 (1995).
2001] 1399
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
lines, and the two individuals who were defendants in the crimi-
nal action. The complaints alleged that Libya and its agents
were responsible for the bombing. The trial court granted
Libya's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion, 107 and the Second Circuit affirmed.1 0 8
In 1996, however, Congress amended the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA) to provide, in part, that foreign states are
no longer immune from personal injury or wrongful death ac-
tions arising from aircraft sabotage if they have been designated
as state sponsors of terrorism.
Shortly after the amendment, plaintiffs again sued Libya and
others, making substantially similar allegations to those that had
previously been dismissed. Libya again moved to dismiss the
case, asserting, among other things, that the 1996 amendment
to the FSIA was unconstitutional. Judge Platt denied the mo-
tion, holding that: (1) the amendment was constitutional; (2)
personal jurisdiction over Libya existed; (3) the designation of a
state as sponsor of terrorism for purposes of the FSIA did not
violate due process; (4) the amendment was rationally related to
a legitimate governmental purpose; and (5) the amendment did
not constitute an impermissible ex post facto law. 10 9
Libya appealed and the Second Circuit affirmed the trial
court's subject matter jurisdiction determination. All other as-
pects of the interlocutory appeal were dismissed "for want of ap-
pellate jurisdiction."'1 0 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in
June 1999,111 and the case was returned to Judge Platt for trial.
Currently, more than 100 plaintiffs have their cases consoli-
dated before Judge Platt. After its return from the appellate
court, Judge Platt stayed the case pending the outcome of the
criminal proceedings in the Netherlands. In February 2001, af-
ter the criminal verdict was entered, the plaintiffs asked Judge
Platt to enter default judgment against Libya because of Libya's
failure to produce documents in discovery. 1 2 Judge Platt de-
107 Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 886 F. Supp. 306 (E.D.
N.Y. 1995).
108 Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239 (2d Cir.
1996).
09 Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 995 F. Supp. 325, 327,
332 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
110 Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan ArabJamahiriya, 162 F.3d 748, 764 (2d Cir.
1998).
111 Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Rein, 527 U.S. 1003 (1999).
112 Pat Milton, Lockerbie Families Want A Default, ASSOCIATED PREss, Feb. 2, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 11949446.
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clined to enter default judgment.' " 3 The next status conference
was set for April 2001. The plaintiffs hope to have a trial and/or
judgment before the end of the year.
3. Insurance Companies vs. Libya
In December 1998, the insurers of Pan Am and Alert Manage-
ment Systems filed suit in federal court in the District of Colum-
bia against Libya and its various agencies, instrumentalities, and
agents. The complaint seeks indemnity, restitution and unjust
enrichment, and contribution for amounts paid by plaintiffs to
those killed or injured in the bombing and for the costs of de-
fending the prior litigation.
Defendants moved to dismiss the claims, asserting various ju-
risdictional defenses and failure to state a claim upon which re-
lief could be granted. Among other things, defendants
contended that 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (7) conferred jurisdiction
only in suits for personal injury or death brought by natural per-
sons who were nationals of the United States.
In September 1999, Judge Thomas F. Hogan denied the de-
fendants' motion.114 The court ruled that third-party actions for
indemnity or contribution were consistent with the principal
statutory purpose of the FSIA, which is to deter foreign states
from sponsoring terrorist activities.' 15 The court also held that
it had personal jurisdiction over the defendants, and that the
insurance companies' complaints stated valid claims for indem-
nification, restitution and unjust enrichment, and contribu-
tion. 16 This case has not been set for trial, as all proceedings
were stayed pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings
in the Netherlands.
113 Id.
"4 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan ArabJamahiriya, Civil No.
98-3096, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15035 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 1999).
115 Id. at *8-*9.
116 Id. at *10-*18.
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